时间 : 2024年04月18日 15时30分
地点 : B校区经管学院103室
主讲人 : 齐保垒 教授
While a large body of literature investigates the determinants of tax aggressiveness, there is conflicting evidence on whether auditors’tax expertise curbs or facilitates clients’tax aggressiveness. However, prior studies examine auditors who also provide non-audit tax services to their clients, which provides the auditor with confounding or conflicting incentives. We predict that signatory auditors with tax expertise, who do not provide non-audit tax services, reduce tax aggressiveness, because tax aggressiveness increases misstatement risk. We test our prediction using Chinese data, which allows us to identify Certified Tax Agents as tax-expert auditors and perform the analysis using auditors who do not provide non-audit tax services. We find that audit clients of signatory auditors with tax expertise, who do not provide non-audit tax services, are less likely to engage in tax aggressiveness. Consistent with a causal relation, we find that an exogenous decrease in tax rates, which reduces clients’incentives to engage in tax aggressiveness, weakens the effect of tax-expertise on tax aggressiveness. We also find that tax-expert auditors attenuate the type of tax aggressiveness that increases tax-related misstatement risk, and that the channels through which tax-expert auditors constrain tax aggressiveness include audit adjustments that increase taxable income.